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PLAYING BY THE RULES: EXAMINING THE
NON-COMPLIANCE OF EU MEMBER STATES REGARDING
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION

Kathleen Duis and Kathleen Montgomery*
Department of Political Science, Illinois Wesleyan University

Anti-discrimination policies and programs have come to the forefront in European Union
social policy in the last five years. However, as national legislation shows, the individual
member states are not equally complying with the policies that the European Union set
forth in 2000. This paper examines and seeks to explain non-compliance of the member
states through a test of two theories: the rational actor model and normative compliance
model. The rational actor analysis suggests that states comply only when compliance
will benefit the state either economically or socially. The normative analysis suggests
that states comply when the legislation is in line with their national norms and values.
This study finds that in order to begin to understand non-compliance a combination of the
two should be used.

